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Abstract 
Recent surveys of wheat importers indicate that countries that import wheat via a state- 
trading enterprise (STE) are less sensitive to quality issues in import decision-making 
than countries that import wheat through private traders. This study examines 
conceptually and empirically the impact of the deregulation of wheat imports on the 
quality and source of wheat imports. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
As people’s income increases they do not demand more food, but safe food of better 
quality and that closely meets their needs. These trends are apparent in the wheat industry 
where exporters have observed a shift in the demand profile of many importers towards 
purchasing better quality grains (Agnet, 2001). For large wheat exporters like the United 
States, Canada, and Australia, the ability to meet those requirements has a direct impact 
on the welfare of domestic producers. 
The increasing demand for better quality wheat is also reinforced by the rapid 
reform of wheat-importing state-trading enterprises (STEs).1 Two recent surveys of major 
wheat importers (Mercier, 1993 and Stephens and Rowan, 1996) found that countries that 
import wheat via a state trader are less sensitive to quality issues in import decision-
making than countries that import wheat through private traders. Moreover, when STEs 
are reformed or eliminated, the quality and diversity of wheat imported increases because 
mills tend to secure specific wheat required for specific end-uses (Stephens and Rowan, 
1996). The difference in the importance of wheat quality for state traders relative to 
private firms is the result of their different objectives.  Importing STEs have various 
mandates, which generally involve achieving domestic agricultural policy objectives such 
as price stability, low prices for consumers and high prices or incomes for producers. 
Because these objectives have priority, end-users have little influence in determining the 
quality specifications of the wheat they receive. However, private importers, which are 
typically multinational traders, large-scale mills, or buying groups, re-sell wheat to the 
various end-users with the intent of maximizing profits (Mercier, 1993).  
 STEs will be challenged under the current round of WTO negotiations. More 
specifically, the United States hopes to end the exclusive import and export rights of 
STEs (Miner, 2001). In the last five years, the countries that have been the top importers 
of U.S. wheat are: Egypt, Japan, China, Phillipines, Pakistan, South Korea, and Mexico. 
Of those countries, two have a STE that controls the imports of wheat (Japan and China) 
and two have imports that are largely dominated by STEs (Egypt and Pakistan) (Abbott 
                                                 
1 According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), STEs are “… governmental and nongovernmental 
enterprises, including marketing board, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, 
including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases 
or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.” (Ackerman and Dixit, 1999, p.2).  
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and Young, 1999).2 Thus, reforming importing STEs could seriously affect the pattern of 
export of U.S. wheat.  
Moreover, recent surveys of importers (Mercier, 1993 and Stephens and Rowan, 
1996) indicate that Canadian and Australian wheat are generally recognized to be of 
higher quality than U.S. wheat by many importers in terms of protein quantity and 
quality, as well as consistency of quality within and among shipments.3 Consistency in 
wheat shipment is an important cost saving factor in milling. When wheat is consistent in 
quality, millers do not have to readjust machine settings. The presence of a strict variety 
licensing system in Canada is the primary reason for the higher quality of Canadian 
wheat relative to U.S. wheat.  
It is therefore important to understand the impact of reforming state-trading 
importers on the quality and diversity of wheat imported, as well as on the source of 
imports, to ascertain the ability of the United States to compete in those markets after the 
reform. Examining the effect of the import deregulation in countries where STEs have 
been eliminated will contribute to this understanding. 
The trend for the reform of wheat-importing STEs is particularly apparent in Latin 
America with Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela eliminating their STE at the end 
of the 1980s or the beginning of 1990s. The elimination or reform of STEs in those 
countries is the result of economic reforms during the second half of the 1980s. South 
Korea also completely deregulated wheat imports in 1990. 
 The objective of this study is to determine whether countries that have reformed 
their STEs at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s have increased the quality 
of wheat imported. A conceptual model is developed showing the circumstances under 
which reform of STEs results in an increase in the quantity of high-quality of wheat 
imported. Using data on exports by major exporters and detailed data on U.S. wheat 
export shipments to Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and South Korea, I then 
examine how the quality of wheat imports has been affected by STE reforms.   
 
                                                 
2 The other major importers have had their STE replaced by private traders (in 1983 for South Korea, 1986 
for the Philippines, and 1992 for Mexico). 
3 Brazil, Venezuela, and South Korea were among the countries surveyed by the USDA, ERS (Mercier, 
1993). Stephens and Rowan (1996) surveyed Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and South Korea. 
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2. Conceptual Model 
Both importing and exporting STEs have been criticized for distorting trade. McCorriston 
and MacLaren (2002) argue that in examining the trade-distorting effect of STEs, the 
counterfactual is not a perfectly competitive market, as is typically assumed, but an 
imperfectly competitive market. Moreover, Fulton, Larue and Veeman (1999) show that 
while an exporting STE may be trade distorting and welfare reducing when the 
counterfactual is perfect competition, with oligopolistic traders, the presence of STEs can 
improve welfare. Thus, the impact of reforming STEs depends on the degree of departure 
from competition after the reform and the specific objective function of the STE. Both 
McCorriston and MacLaren and Fulton, Larue and Veeman examine the trade impact of 
STEs by considering the commodity traded to be homogeneous. In this paper, I take their 
work further and examine the impact of the reform of wheat importing STE on the 
quality of wheat import when oligopolists replace a STE and wheat is a vertically 
differentiated product.  
Consider a country that imports wheat for processing into an end product, e.g., 
flour. Wheat imports are differentiated by quality, i.e., low- (kL) and high-quality (kH) 
wheat. Wheat is also produced domestically and is of lower quality (kD) than foreign 
wheat, i.e., . Importing countries typically produce wheat that must be 
blended with higher quality foreign wheat to achieve the desired characteristics. For 
example, in Latin American markets, the primary competitors to U.S. wheat are 
Canadian, Argentinean and domestic wheat. Due to agronomic conditions, Argentinean 
and domestic wheat are usually considered to be of lower quality (primarily lower protein 
content) than U.S. or Canadian wheat. Therefore, those importers will typically blend 
domestic and Argentinean wheat with either U.S. or Canadian wheat to achieve the 
desired end-product characteristics. For example, for bread making, wheat of high-
protein level is desired because it is the protein (gluten) that allows the dough to rise. 
D Lk k k< < H
Domestic millers are differentiated on the basis of the quality (km) of the output 
they produce, with k  and k[0;1]m ∈ m being uniformly distributed. A typical miller, miller 
i, maximizes the profit from transforming one unit of wheat into one unit (measured in 
input adjusted units) of an end-product. Profit corresponds to 
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Higher quality end product results in higher processing cost because it requires, for 
example, more labor input to monitor the various steps of processing and insure that the 
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For tractability purposes, assume that k  and , where 
p is the premium for end-product quality. Millers are assumed to be price takers in the 
output market.  Thus, a typical miller faces the following profit function: 
( )P k
 
,
y imported wheat
imported wheat
wheat
 (1) 
This formulation is in the spirit of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of vertical 
differentiation.  
To derive millers demand for the domestic and the two qualities of imported 
wheat, millers indifferent between buying the high- and low-quality wheat ( ) , 
the low-quality and domestic wheat ( , and the miller indifferent between buying 
the domestic wheat or nothing ( must be found. For that, kHL, kLD, kD0, must 
satisfy the following equations respectively: 
  (2) ( ) (,i HL H i HL Lk k k kΠ = Π ),
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Thus, millers with  buy the high-quality imported wheat, millers with 
buy the low-quality imported wheat, millers with  buy the 
domestic wheat, and millers with  do not purchase wheat. Accordingly, the 
demands for the three wheat qualities facing the wheat intermediary are: 
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Two scenarios of market intermediaries are examined. In the first scenario, the 
intermediary between domestic millers and domestic producers and foreign exporters is a 
STE. In the second scenario, the STE is replaced with m Cournot profit-maximizing 
private intermediaries as in McCorriston and MacLaren (2002). An important aspect of 
modeling STEs is to specify correctly the objective function (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). 
Importing STEs are known to have a variety of objective functions especially in 
developing countries where they may be used to generate revenue for the treasury, 
provide cheap food to domestic consumers, and stabilize prices (Sexton and Lavoie, 
2001). Importing STEs may also regulate trade for the purpose of generating high prices 
and incomes for domestic producers (Abbott and Young, 1999). Finally, they may also be 
used to countervail the market power of large exporters (STEs or multinational firms). 
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When modeling importing STEs, previous authors have assumed that these 
entities use their market power to maximize either producer surplus plus rent from 
imports (McCorriston and MacLaren, 2002), or producer surplus plus rent from exports 
(Larue, Fulton, and Veeman, 1999). Love and Murniningtyas (1992) modeled the 
Japanese Food Agency as maximizing profit, where the JFA is in a position to exercise 
monopsony power in the purchase of domestic and foreign wheat, and exercise monopoly 
power in domestic wheat resale. I follow McCorriston and MacLaren (2002) and assume 
the importing STE maximizes domestic producer surplus plus rents from imports. 
In what follows, I derive the equilibrium quantity of domestic, and imported 
wheat and compare those quantities under the two scenarios. To examine and compare 
the two scenarios, the demand equations given by equations (5)-(7) must be expressed in 
their inverse form, i.e.,  
( ), , ; , , ,H H L D H L Dp Q Q Q k k k p
( , , ; , , ,D H L D H L Dp Q Q Q k k k p
, , and 
. See appendix I for the expressions. 
( ), , ; , , ,L H L D H L Dp Q Q Q k k k p
)
2.1 Equilibrium with a STE 
Following, MacLaren and McCorriston (2002), I assume that the cost function arises 
solely from the purchase of products from the domestic sector or the world market. 
Essentially, the STE faces a residual supply on the world market. The functional forms 
are: 
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The STE is assumed to maximize domestic producer welfare plus the rent from 
imports by choosing the quantity of domestic and imported wheat to buy and re-sell: 
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∫  
where  represents the vector of exogenous variables, i.e., (kα H, kL, kD, p). Solving 
simultaneously for the first-order conditions with respect to QH, QL, and QD gives the 
equilibrium quantity of wheat imported (Q and ) and the quantity of domestic STEH
STE
LQ
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wheat purchased ( ) by the STE. The expressions for the first-order conditions and 
the equilibrium values are shown in appendix I. 
STE
DQ
,
H L
L
Q Q
Q
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2.2 Equilibrium with m Cournot private traders 
Under the reform of wheat imports, the STE is replaced by private importers. It is 
assumed here for simplicity that the private importers would act as intermediary between 
millers and the domestic producers and foreign exporters. A typical Cournot firm (firm i) 
maximizes profit in the purchase and sale of the three wheat qualities according to: 
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Solving simultaneously for the first-order conditions and aggregating the equilibrium 
quantities of the three qualities of wheat over m private firms gives the equilibrium 
quantities, i.e., Q , and . The expressions for the first-order conditions and the 
equilibrium values are shown in appendix I. 
P
                                                
P
DQ
2.3 Does the Quantity of High-Quality Wheat Imported Increase when STE are 
Reformed? 
To examine the change in the mix of wheat qualities imported when m Cournot traders 
replace the STE, I compare the difference in the equilibrium quantity of the three wheat 
qualities under the two scenarios using a numerical analysis. Figure 1, 2, and 3 show the 
change in the equilibrium quantity of high-quality, low-quality, and domestic wheat 
respectively when private traders replace a STE. The change in quantity is examined in 
relation to the quality of the high-quality wheat and under the assumptions that kD=0.7, 
kL=1, and p=1.5.4 Table 1 show the magnitude of the impact of the reform when kH=1.5.  
 
 
4 It is assumed that the market is not covered, i.e., some millers do not buy the differentiated input or 
kD0>0, because with this formulation, the demand functions can be inverted and an equilibrium with 
Cournot interaction between private firms can be examined (Motta, 1993). The market is not fully covered 
if and only if . This condition explains the choice of p=1.5.  1/p >
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Table 1. Percentage increase or decrease in the equilibrium quantity after the reform (for 
kD=0.7, kL=1, p=1.5, and kH=1.5) 
 m=1 m=2 m=5 
QH 0.26% 33.68% 67.10% 
QL 0.64% 34.19% 67.73% 
QD -45.63% -27.51% -9.39% 
 
Figures 1, 2, and 3, reveal that imports of both high- and low-quality wheat 
increase and the quantity of domestic wheat decreases when private firms replace the 
STE. This result is consistent with McCorriston and MacLaren (2002) who show that the 
concern for market access is valid when producer surplus maximizing STEs are 
responsible for imports. Table 1 shows that the percentage increase is similar for the 
high- and low-quality wheat regardless of the number of private firms. The increase in 
imports becomes important when two or more private firms replace the STE. 
The increase in imports and decrease in the use of domestic wheat after the reform 
of a STE is the outcome two effects, 1) an increase in vertical market power in the 
domestic supply chain with the replacement of a STE exerting market power in domestic 
wheat sales with private firms with market power both in buying and selling domestic 
wheat, 2) an horizontal competitive effect when more than one firm compete for the 
purchase and sales of both domestic and foreign wheat. The first effect results in a 
decrease in the quantity of domestic wheat bought and sold, an increase in the price of 
domestic wheat to millers, and thus the substitution of domestic wheat for foreign wheat. 
The second effect results in a downward pressure on wheat prices, thus a positive effect 
in the purchase of all three wheat qualities. Only the first effect is present when m=1. 
With m>1 both effects support an increase in wheat imports. However, the net impact on 
the equilibrium quantity of domestic wheat depends on the number of Cournot firms. 
With a large enough number of firms (m=12 in the current numerical scenario), the 
competitive effect offsets the vertical market power effect on the domestic market and the 
quantity of domestic wheat bought and sold increases when private traders replace the 
STE. In other words, with a large enough number of private traders, the overall effect of 
the reform of an STE would be to increase competition and increase the quantity of wheat 
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processed domestically through an increase in the purchase of both foreign and domestic 
wheat.  
While the overall quantity of wheat imported increases when private traders 
replace the STE, it is of interest to determine how the relative mix of quality is affected. 
Particularly, I examine the circumstance under which there would be an increase in the 
quantity of high-quality wheat imported relative to the low-quality wheat. Figure 4 and 5 
show the change in quantity of high-quality wheat imported relative to low-quality wheat. 
Figure 4 expresses the relative change as the ratio of the absolute change in quantities, 
i.e., ( ) ( )P STE P STEH H L LQ Q Q Q− − . A ratio greater than one indicates that imports of the high-
quality wheat increase relatively more than imports of low-quality wheat. The result 
differs depending on the number of private firms replacing the STE. If only one firm 
replaces the STE, the increase in the quantity of high-quality wheat imported is smaller 
than the increase in the low-quality wheat. However, when m>1, imports of high-quality 
wheat increase by more than imports of low-quality wheat. When m=1, only one effect 
explains the change in equilibrium, i.e., an increase in vertical market power due to a 
change in the objective function of the market intermediary. As mentioned earlier, the 
impact of the change in objective function is a decrease in the quantity of domestic wheat 
purchased. The resulting increase in price of domestic wheat to millers makes foreign 
wheat relatively more attractive. Thus, some millers buying domestic wheat in the STE 
regime will find the low-quality wheat relatively more attractive under the private firm 
regime. Given that low-quality wheat is a better substitute for domestic wheat, the impact 
of the reform of a STE when it is replaced by one firm is larger on the domestic wheat 
market and its closest substitute, i.e., the low-quality wheat.  
Note also that with more than one private firms, the increase in imports in the 
high-quality wheat relative to the increase in the low-quality wheat is maximized when 
kH=1.5, that is when the high-quality wheat of 50 percent higher quality than the low-
quality wheat in the current numerical scenario. This outcome makes sense given the 
convex nature of the millers’ processing costs with respect to wheat quality. In other 
words, because a higher quality wheat decreases processing cost at a decreasing rate, the 
high-quality wheat becomes less and less attractive relative to the low-quality wheat the 
higher kH is. Given the chosen functional forms, this result indicates that the greatest 
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benefit for countries exporting high-quality wheat from the reform of STE may not 
accrue to the country with the highest quality wheat, but the country with the optimal 
quality wheat given the quality of the domestic wheat, and willingness to pay of 
consumers for the quality of the end-product (p). 
Finally, figure 5 shows the difference in the share of the high-quality wheat of 
total imports, i.e., ( ) ( ) 100%P P P STE STE STEH H L H H LQ Q Q Q Q Q + − + ⋅  . The figure shows that 
there is a small decrease in market share of the high-quality wheat when private traders 
replace a STE and that the decrease in market share is more important the greater is the 
quality of the high-quality wheat. 
Thus, what is learned from figure 1 through 5 regarding wheat imports can be 
summarized as follows. A country imports less wheat with a wheat-importing STE 
maximizing producer surplus than with private traders. High-quality wheat occupies a 
larger share of imports under the STE regime. The import of both high- and low-quality 
wheat increases when private traders replace the STE. The increase in import is greater 
for the high-quality than the low-quality wheat when more than one private trader 
replaces the STE.  
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
Using yearly data from FAOSTAT on wheat exports from 1980 to 2000, I examine the 
pattern of imports of countries that reformed their wheat-importing STE at the end of the 
1980s and beginning of 1990s. Table 2 lists those countries, the name of the STE, and the 
year of reform. 
 The objective of this analysis is to make observations on the trade pattern and 
quality of wheat imported before and after the reform. A more rigorous analysis will be 
required to examine whether the predictions of the conceptual model hold for those 
countries, as many factors may explain the changes in trade patterns. In this analysis, 
high-quality wheat is defined as wheat from Canada and Australia, and low-quality wheat 
refers to wheat from other exporters. This classification corresponds to outcomes of 
surveys of importers, who recognized Canada and Australia as having greater wheat 
quality. Important wheat quality characteristics differ by importing countries and 
importers. However, consistency in quality and intrinsic quality, especially the level and 
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consistency of protein quantity and quality, emerged as important characteristics for 
importers in general and those for which Canada and Australia ranked the highest 
(Mercier, 1983; Stephens and Rowan, 1996). 
 
Table 2. Countries, STE, and Year of Reform 
Country STE Year of Reform 
Brazil CTRIN 1991 
Colombia IDEMA 1992 
Mexico CONASUPO 1992 
Venezuela CORPOMERCADEO 1989 
South Korea KOFMIA 1990 
Source: Adapted from Abbott and Young (1999) and KOFMIA (2000). 
 
 As shown in figures 7 to 10 and in table 3, all countries increased their imports of 
wheat after reforming their STEs. Mexico has the largest percentage increase in quantity 
and Venezuela, the smallest increase. Imports of higher quality wheat, i.e., Canadian and 
Australian wheat, also increase after the reform by more than 100 percent for all 
countries except for Brazil. The other exporters lose after the reform in Colombia and in 
Venezuela. Canada and Australia were able to increase their market share of imports in 
Colombia, Venezuela, and South Korea as shown in table 4. However, their market share 
decreased in Brazil and Mexico. 
 
Table 3. Average exports before and after the reform of the STE ('000 Metric Tons) 
 By All Exporters By Canada and Australia By Rest of Exporters 
To: 
Before 
Reform 
After 
Reform 
% 
Change 
Before 
Reform 
After 
Reform 
% 
Change 
Before 
Reform 
After 
Reform 
% 
Change 
Brazil 3,041 6,012 98% 876 872 0% 2,166 5,140 137% 
Colombia 647 985 52% 114 483 324% 533 502 -6% 
Mexico 569 1,979 248% 209 690 230% 360 1,289 258% 
Venezuela 952 1,123 18% 189 460 143% 763 663 -13% 
South Korea 2,538 3,864 52% 587 1,848 215% 1,951 2,016 3% 
 
Table 4. Share of exports by Canada and Australia 
 Before Reform After Reform 
Brazil 29% 14% 
Colombia 18% 49% 
Mexico 37% 35% 
Venezuela 20% 41% 
South Korea 23% 48% 
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 Such increase in imports in the 1990s by all importers could also be due to other 
factors such as a decrease in the price of wheat. However, figure 11 shows that the 
nominal price of wheat for major exporters increased in the first part of the 1990s to a 
peak in 1996 and then decreased. Thus, a price explanation can be ruled out. In what 
follows I provide some information on the liberalization of imports in the five countries 
of interest to help understand the nature of the change in import quantity and sources.  
3.1. Brazil 
In Brazil, the government took total control over the wheat market in 1967. According to 
Monteiro da Silva and Grennes (1999) the objectives of the government was to a) give 
priority to national wheat; b) regulate marketing activities through the monopoly power 
of the government in buying domestic and imported wheat; c) guarantee domestic supply 
and improve storage capacity; and d) regulate the expansion of mills. Self-sufficiency in 
production was behind those objectives. With the liberalization of the wheat market in 
1989, all direct subsidies to producers and consumers were eliminated. Private sector 
imports were legalized by 1991 and tariffs were set on imported wheat. 
According to Stephens and Rowan (1996), soon after imports were privatized 
buying groups evolved to reduce risk exposure and take advantage of lower freight costs 
associated with larger vessels. Moreover, there was a sharp decline in domestic 
production after the deregulation, which may explain some of the increase in imports 
observed in figure 6. The prevalence of imports from Argentina after the deregulation can 
be explained by the creation of preferential tariffs between Brazil and Argentina and the 
Mercosur Agreement, which was signed in 1991. Moreover, imports of Argentine wheat 
are relatively more attractive for Brazilian mills because they are not assessed a maritime 
import tax of 25% on freight costs. 
3.2. Colombia 
According to Garcia Garcia (1991), the role of the STE Instituto de Mercadeo 
Agropecuario (IDEMA) was to facilitate agricultural production and imports and exports 
of agricultural and food products. It collected customs revenue that would have otherwise 
gone to the Central Government and thus suffered from import bias in its operation. This 
perhaps explains why the rise in imports after the liberalization of imports was not as 
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dramatic as in Brazil. Until 1992, IDEMA was the sole importer of wheat and was 
exempt from import taxes.  
3.3. Mexico 
According to Flores (1999), before the reforms in the late 1980s, Mexico was among the 
most protected economies. CONASUPO was the sole buyer of wheat until 1992 and 
handled pricing decision and trade activities. CONASUPO was also in charge of 
implementing price support schemes for wheat and other agricultural products. After the 
reform of imports, many mills starting purchasing foreign wheat through buying groups. 
As a result of joining NAFTA in 1994, Mexico abolished an import licensing 
requirements and imposed a 15 percent tariff on wheat imports, which are to be phased 
out in 2004. Other trade barriers were also to be phased out over a period of 15 years 
(Flores, 1999). Finally, the continued strong growth in wheat imports through the 1990s 
observed in figure 8 may be due to a decrease in wheat production. According to the 
Economist (October 2000), with the disappearance of price guarantees, wheat growers 
have been shifting to other crops such as nuts, peaches, and chillies, because they cannot 
compete with cheap imports from across the borders.  
3.4. Venezuela 
Venezuela has always been dependent on imports to meet domestic demand for wheat. 
Prior to the economic reform in 1989, the government controlled trade by requiring wheat 
importers to obtain import licenses. The goal of the reform was to reduce government 
intervention in the economy. As part of the reform, quantitative controls were replaced by 
a variable tariff levied on imports to maintain a minimum import price floor. With 
accession to GATT in 1990, Venezuela has been revising its tariff schedule. According to 
Setia and Dusch (1993), the increase in the market share of Canada in the 1990s as seen 
in figure 9 was due to aggressive Canadian marketing strategies. 
3.5. South Korea 
Prior to 1983, the Korea Flour Millers Industry Association (KOFMIA) operated a 
government mandated import monopoly for wheat and controlled the price of wheat 
flour. In 1983, the government began a series of deregulation to progressively turn import 
decisions over to the private sector. KOFMIA’s import monopoly was eliminated then, 
but the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) remained involved in 
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establishing import requirements and allocated import quotas among member companies. 
In 1990, the quota system was abolished and imports, thus, fully liberalized. Since then 
Korean mills have been able to import wheat according to their specific needs. Four 
buying groups were formed based to obtain efficiencies in ocean freight and reduce port 
costs (Stephens and Rowan, 1996) 
Other than its location, South Korea differs from the previous countries with 
higher per capita GDP. With a population with greater purchasing power, Korean millers 
have had to adapt their milling facilities to meet growing and changing consumer 
demands. The level of milling technology in South Korea is now fairly sophisticated. 
According to Stephens and Rowan, while food wheat imports have risen by a relatively 
small amount relative to feed wheat, floor millers have increased the number of 
individual flours produced from 10-12 in 1982 to as many as 70 different flours in the 
mid 1990s.5 “Bakeries and noodle manufacturers are demanding more specific flour 
specifications to meet consumer demands for an increasingly wider range of products” 
(Stephens and Rowan, 1996, p. 94). 
Figure 10 reveals that, prior to 1983, the United States had a 100 percent share of 
the South Korean market. However, its share dropped with the deregulation of imports. 
According to Raney and Morgan (1993), the primary reason is that Australian wheat 
provides specific and more consistent intrinsic characteristics, such as protein quantity 
and gluten strength. However, despite the variability in protein quality and quantity, U.S. 
DNS wheat is preferred to Canadian CWRS wheat. 
Disaggregated data on U.S. exports shipments obtained from the U.S. Grain 
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) reveals a change in the mix 
of wheat imports from the United States after the deregulation in 1990. Such a clear 
effect may be due to a combination of a lack of other trade and domestic policies 
affecting imports after the deregulation and the higher per capita income of the South 
Korean population, which demand greater standards and variety in the wheat products 
consumed. 
Figure 12 shows an overall increase in Hard Red Spring (HRS) wheat imports by 
South Korea after the complete liberalization of imports in 1990. HRS has the highest 
                                                 
5 Note that figure 10 contains exports of both food and feed wheat. 
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protein content (from 13 to 16 percent). It is mostly used for blending with lower-protein 
wheats, and for specialty products such as bagels and frozen doughs that require high 
protein content with strong gluten properties. It is divided into subclasses, Dark North 
Spring (DNS) being the highest quality subclass, followed by Northern Spring (NS). 
Each subclass is further divided in grades, which also reflect different quality level, 
related to the purity of the wheat. In order of higher quality are grade 1, grade 2 or better 
(o/b), and grade 2. Figure 12 shows that by 1994, almost all imports of HRS wheat by 
South Korea were of the highest quality. 
Figure 13 shows an overall decrease in imports of Hard Red Winter (HRW) 
wheat. HRW is a medium protein wheat, ranging between 10 and 12 percent protein 
content. It is used mainly to produce bread and rolls. Notice a similar transition to the 
highest grade immediately after the full liberalization of imports in 1990. These figures 
present strong support for an increase in wheat quality after import deregulation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examined conceptually and empirically whether the quality of wheat imported 
increases when importing STEs are reformed and replaced by private traders. The 
conceptual model shows that after the reform of a STE maximizing producer surplus, 
imports of both high- and low-quality wheat increases. The increase in imports is the 
result of two effects. First, there is an increase in market power in the wheat supply chain 
when private firms with market power both in purchase and sale of wheat replace the 
STE. The increase in market power causes an increase in the price of domestic wheat that 
makes imported wheat relatively more attractive. Second, when more than one private 
firm replace the STE, competition among firms bring the price of all wheat qualities 
down, which has a positive impact on wheat imports. Imports of high-quality wheat 
increase relatively more than imports of low-quality wheat when more than one firm 
replace the STE. Post-reform observations in the markets considered in this study reveals 
that, in many instances, more than one buying groups form after the demise of a STE. 
 The examination of trade data for five countries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and South Korea) that reformed their wheat imports in the late 1980s or early 
1990s supports the predictions of the conceptual model. The average quantity of imports 
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before and after the reform increased for all five countries. Moreover, imports of 
Canadian and Australian wheat – considered being of higher quality in recent importers’ 
survey – increased for all countries except Brazil. Canada and Australia gained market 
share in Colombia, Venezuela, and South Korea. More disaggregated data on U.S. wheat 
exports to South Korea revealed a marked transition to higher grades of Hard Red Spring 
and Hard Red Winter wheat after the complete deregulation of imports in 1990. 
 The conceptual and empirical analyses of this paper support an increase in market 
access and more specifically an increase in imports of high-quality wheat after the reform 
of STEs. These results have important policy implications for U.S. policy makers who 
have demanded the elimination of all state traders under the current round of WTO 
negotiations. First, while removing importing STEs may increase market access, the 
boost on U.S. exports may not be significant if it results in the importation of higher 
quality wheat. In other words, importers may turn to countries like Canada and Australia, 
which are recognized for their higher quality wheat (Mercier, 1993, and Stephens and 
Rowan, 1996). Second, it raises the questions of whether the United States can 
adequately meet additional demand for high-quality wheat and whether an alternative 
approach to support U.S. farmers is to develop stricter variety standards like those 
existing in Canada. Future work will investigate those questions. 
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Appendix I 
 
The models below were solved using Mathematica 4. 
 
Inverse Demands 
( ) ( )1, , ; 1D H LH H L D H L D
D H L
Q Q Qp Q Q Q p Q Q Q
k k k
α −= + + − + + −  
( ) ( )1 1, , ; L D D H L L H L DL H L D
D L
k Q k Q Q k p Q Q Q
p Q Q Q
k k
α + + − − + + −  =  
( ) ( )( )1 1, , ; L H L DD H L D
D
k p Q Q Q
p Q Q Q
k
α − + + −=  
 
Equilibrium with a STE 
 
Maximization problem: 
( )
( )
, ,, ,
0
,
max ( , ; ) ( ; ) , ; ( ; )
, ; ( ; )
D
H L D
Q
s s
D H L D D D D H H L D H H HQ Q Q
s
L H L D L L L L
W p Q Q Q Q p x k dx p Q Q Q p Q k Q
p Q Q Q p Q k Q
α α
α
 = − + − 
 + − 
∫ H  
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First-Order Conditions: 
( )1 2 1 22 20 2 0H H H H LD LD
H D L H
k k p Q k pQQ QW p pQ
Q k k k
+ + − + ∂  = → + − + − =∂  
( ) ( )2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
0 0L D D H L D H L L L L
L L D
k Q k Q k p Q Q Q k k p QW
Q k k
+ − − + − + − + ∂  = → =∂  
( )2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
0 0D H L D D D D H L
D D
Q Q Q k k Q p Q Q QW
Q k
+ + − − + + + − ∂  = → =∂  
 
Equilibrium Quantities: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }{ }2 2 2 2 3 32 2 1 1 1 1L H L H L D H H L L L L L D H L L L L L
STE
H
k k k k k k k k k p k k k k p k k k p k p k k k p
Q
A
       − − + − + + + − − + + − − + −         =
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 22 2 2 2 1H L L D D L D LSTE
L
k k k k k p k p k k p
Q
A
 − + − + + − =  
( ) ( ) ( )2 3 1D H L LSTE
D
k k k k p
Q
A
−=  
where: 
  
( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
2 2 3 2
2 2 2 2
3 2 3 2
2 1 2 1
2 1 1 1
1 1
L L H L H L D H L H L L H
D H H L L L L L H L L L
D L L L H L L H L L L
A k k k k k k k p k k k k k k
k k k k p k k k k p k k k k p
k k k k p k k p k p k k k k p
 = − − + + + + − + − + − +    
     + + + − − + − + +     
 − + + + − + + −   
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Equilibrium with m Private Traders 
 
Maximization problem of trader i: 
( )
( )
, ,
, ,
,
max ( , ; ) ( ; ) , ; ( ; )
, ; ( ; )
Hi Li Di
s s
i D H L D D D D Di H H L D H H H Hi
q q q
s
L H L D L L L Li
p Q Q Q p Q k q p Q Q Q p Q k q
p Q Q Q p Q k q
α α
α
  ∏ = − + −   
 + − 
 
 
First-Order Conditions: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )21 11 1 1 110 0L L LiD Hi L Hii
Hi L D L L
m k k p qm k p q m k p q
p
q k k k k
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )21 11 1 1 110 0H H HiD Di L Lii
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p
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )21 11 1 1 110 0D D DiD Hi D Lii
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Equilibrium Quantities: 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ }}
2 2 3 2 2
3 3
1 1
1 1 /
P
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21
( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 3 1H L D D L D L D L DP
L
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B
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Figure 1. Difference in the quantity of high-quality wheat imported when m Cou
private traders replace a STE (  (with k)P STEH HQ Q− D=0.7, kL=1, and p=
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Figure 2. Difference in the quantity of low-quality wheat imported when m Cou
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Figure 3. Difference in the equilibrium quantity of domestic wheat when m Cour
private traders replace a STE (  (with k)P STED DQ Q− D=0.7, kL=1, and p=1
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Figure 4. Ratio of the increase in high-quality relative to low-quality wheat when
Cournot private traders replace a STE ( ) ( )( )P STE P STEH H L LQ Q Q Q− −  (with
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Figure 5. Difference in high-quality wheat share of imports between private trader
STE regimes (with kD=0.7, kL=1, and p=1.5). 
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Figure 6. Exports of wheat by all exporters to Brazil. (Source: FAOSTAT) 
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Figure 7. Exports of wheat by all exporters to Colombia. (Source: FAOSTAT) 
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Figure 8. Exports of wheat by all exporters to Mexico. (Source: FAOSTAT) 
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Figure 9. Exports of wheat by all exporters to Venezuela. (Source: FAOSTAT) 
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Figure 10. Exports of wheat by all exporters to South Korea. (Source: FAOSTAT) 
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Figure 11. Nominal export wheat prices. (Source: USDA, ERS, Wheat Yearbook) 
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Figure 12. Exports of U.S. Hard Red Spring Wheat to South Korea. (Source: GIPSA) 
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Figure 13. Exports of U.S. Hard Red Winter wheat to South Korea. (Source: GIPSA) 
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